Limitation of the Beth Din’s Authority Under the English Arbitration Act

23 Jun

One recent Court of Appeal decision makes clear that a Beth Din cannot properly claim for itself unfettered authority to review or issue arbitral awards.

In Gluck v Endzweig [2026] EWCA Civ 145, the Court of Appeal confirmed that although a Beth Din can create unique amendment powers, it may not provide that it has unfettered or unlimited authority to review its own awards.  The Beth Din’s arbitration agreement, which included a clause allowing it to review or amend its own arbitral awards “at any time” was inconsistent with section 57 of the Arbitration Act 1996, which requires finality in arbitration.  A Beth Din’s standard arbitration agreement including this language would be void and any award issued on the basis of such arbitration agreement could be set aside.

Summary Background

The parties agreed for their dispute to be sent to arbitration in front of the Federation Beth Din.  The arbitration agreement at issue provided the Beth Din with the authority “to amend and add to and change the judgment they have given, at any time.”

The Beth Din issued an award in favour of Gluck.  Gluck proceeded to obtain permission to enforce the award under section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996. Permission was granted. Endzweig applied to set the award aside on the basis that the Beth Din confirmed that the award was still under review and not yet final.

The lower court agreed, holding that the arbitration clause was a valid expansion of the tribunal’s correction powers under section 57(1) of the Act, and that the statutory 28-day time limits could not be implied because they were inconsistent with the words “at any time.”

The Court of Appeal’s decision

Lord Justice Dingemans (with whom Lords Justices Phillips and Lewis agreed) addressed three issues.

Section 58(1) of the Arbitration Act provides that an arbitral award is “final and binding,” and this does not permit parties to agree a process under which an award may never become final at all. Even treating the clause as an agreed expansion of correction powers under section 57(1), the clause must still produce finality at a defined point. A clause with no time limit whatsoever cannot satisfy that requirement, and the default 28-day provisions could not be read in to rescue it.

Was the Court of Appeal right?

The Court of Appeal decision leaves open the possibility that parties can enter into an arbitration agreement which provides the arbitral body with powers of review for an unreasonably long period of time, so long as the time period has a definitive end.  The CoA’s decision would presumably not invalidate an arbitration agreement which gave the Beth Din the power to review its awards for the next 10,000 years.  This tension was clearly not intended by the Arbitration Act and the CoA will ultimately have to resolve the issue.

What does this mean in practice?

Foremost, the case is a cautionary tale for all Beth Din panels and parties in arbitration before a Beth Din: the Beth Din cannot claim unlimited or unfettered authority and must abide by the limitations in the Arbitration Act.  Parties who lost an arbitration in Beth Din may still be able to challenge the Beth Din award if their arbitration agreement contained a clause repugnant to the Arbitration Act. Clauses designed to accommodate religious courts are given deference, but are worth reviewing in light of this decision.

The Authors

Yisrael Hiller and Sayana Turpin are members of Asserson’s Dispute Resolution practice and frequently act for clients in connection with arbitration-related disputes.